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We trade because we are different. Gains from trade and the scope for mutually
advantageous reallocation depend naturally on the diversity of the traders' preferences
and endowments. The market owes its existence to the diversity of those who make up
the economy.
An excess of diversity could however stretch the ability of economic institutions to
operate efficiently: this has recently been a concern in regions experiencing extensive
and rapid migration, such as US and the ex-USSR. Are there natural limits on the
degree of social diversity with which our institutions can cope? This paper will argue
that there are. I shall argue that not only is a certain amount of diversity essential
for the functioning of markets, but, at the other extreme, that too much diversity of
a society's preferences and endowments may hinder its ability to allocate resources
efficiently. This will be examined rigorously in the context of two classical forms of
resource allocation: by markets, and by social choice or voting, arguably those most
frequently used in modern economies.
Until quite recently, diversity has been an elusive concept. However, a precise
measure of social diversity will be given here in terms of the preferences and endowments
of individuals. This concept is robust to small errors in measurements, and independent
of the units of measurement. I shall establish that too much social diversity in this
sense can interfere with the efficient performance of markets and with the achievement
of social choices.
Shifting the angle of inquiry slightly sheds a different light on the subject. If a
society allocates resources efficiently, whether by markets or by collective choices, then
this society must exhibit no more than a certain degree of social diversity. There
is therefore an implicit prediction here about the characteristics of economies which
evolve mechanisms for allocating resources efficiently: they will have only a limited
degree of social diversity in my sense. Economies which do not succeed in allocating
resource efficiently are not likely to be observed in practice, so that enduring economies
are likely to have limited social diversity.
The precise degree of social diversity which is consistent with the market reaching
efficient allocations is described here by a condition of limited arbitrage. Intuitively,
this gages the extent of the gains from trade. This paper defines limited arbitrage
precisely from the endowments and preferences, and then defines the degree of social
diversity which it implies. It provides examples of economies with and without limited
arbitrage. It shows by means of examples why limited arbitrage separates those markets
which have a competitive equilibrium from those that do not, and why it simultaneously
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separates those economies which have well defined social choice rules from those which
do not.
From this analysis a new unified perspective emerges on the central question of
resource allocation. This is the existence of a well-defined connection between two
classic forms of resource allocation which have been considered separate and almost
antagonistic until now: markets and public choices. The same limitation on social
diversity links these two forms of resource allocation. Limited arbitrage is necessary
and sufficient for the existence of competitive market allocations. It is also necessary
and sufficient for the existence of well-defined social choice rules. One can actually
translate one form of resource allocation into the other. The success of both hinges
on the same limitation on the social diversity of the economy. The economies which
we observe in practice, if successful at either form of resource allocation, will exhibit
a limited amount of social diversity. Turning this proposition around it implies that
increases in diversity beyond this threshold may call for forms of resource allocation
different from both.
1. Limited Arbitrage and Gains from Trade. Intuitively limited arbitrage
bounds the extent of gains from trade in the economy. To offer a formal perspective one
needs a few definitions. An economy E has H > 2 traders who trade JV > 2 commodities
or assets, so that the trading space is RN; when short sales are not allowed the trading
space is instead RN+. A trader i is described by an initial endowment fit £ RN, and by
a preference represented by a utility function U{ : RN —*• R.
One wishes to identify those trading opportunities which could yield unbounded
utility increases for the ith trader. These are described by net trades in A, = {y € RN :
VA > 0, Ui(Qi + Ay) > Ui(O;) and lim;\-l.oo'ui(^t + Ay) = supxGi?^ Ui(x)}, a concept new
to the literature, which contains global information about the trader and is therefore
called a global cone. The trader's market cone is the set of all those prices at which
all trading opportunities in A,- are unaffordable, Dt = {p € RN+ : < p, (y — fi,-) >
> 0}.1 The existence of both competitive equilibrium and social choice rules is shown
to depend on the relation between the traders' market cones; this relation also provides
a framework for measuring social diversity.
DEFINITION 1. The market economy E has limited arbitrage when all its market
cones intersect: Hili &i ^ <f)-
This means that there exists one price, the same for all traders, at which the
trades they can afford only increase their utilities by limited, or bounded, amounts.
The concept of limited arbitrage can also be interpreted in terms of gains from trade,
defined as the maximum increment in the sum of utilities which the traders can achieve
by reallocating the economy's resources:
Gains from trade = G{E) = Sup I ^ ufai) — u,(n,) I ,
\t=i /
where for all i u,(x,) > w,(O,) and Y^,iLi{xi ~ ^») = 0«
PROPOSITION 2. An economy E satisfies limited arbitrage if and only if it has
bounded gains from trade, namely G(E) < oo.
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For a proof see the Appendix. The geometry of limited arbitrage is simple: it
means that the traders' global cones cannot contain net trades which add up to zero:
~ 3 X{,Xj such that x, + Xj = 0, X{ 6 Ai and Xj 6 Aj. In other words: all global cones
A{ must lie on one side of a given price hyperplane.
Figure 1 illustrates an economy E\ with two traders and two assets which has
limited arbitrage. Its global cones are A\ and A2 and the price line p leaves both cones
on one side. Therefore net trades in directions which lead to unbounded utility gains
are unaffordable by all traders from their initial endowments at price p. The gains from
trade in this economy G(E\) are bounded.
The economy of Figure 2 does not satisfy limited arbitrage: there are two directions
of net trades w[ G A\ and u^ E A2, yielding unbounded increases in utility and which
sum up to zero. Therefore, there is no price p at which all net trades in A\ and in A2
are unaffordable from initial endowments. The gains from trade in this economy are
unbounded.
Section 3 shows that the boundedness of possible gains from trade, which we now
know to be equivalent to limited arbitrage, is fundamental to the existence of a com-
petitive equilibrium: it is necessary and sufficient. Intuitively this is reasonable: an
economy such as that in Figure 2, where traders wish to take unboundedly large and
opposed trading positions, cannot reach an equilibrium. Desired trades are just too
diverse to be accommodated within the same economy.
2. Limited Arbitrage and No-Arbitrage. In financial markets an arbitrage
opportunity exists when individuals can make unbounded gains at no cost, or, equiv-
alently, by taking no risks. For example, buying an asset in a market where its price
is low while simultaneously selling it at another where its price is high can lead to un-
bounded gains at no risk to the trader. No-arbitrage means that such opportunities do
not exist, and it provides a standard way of pricing a financial asset: precisely so that
no arbitrage opportunities should arise between this and other related assets. Since
trading does not cease until all arbitrage opportunities are extinguished, at a market
clearing equilibrium there is no-arbitrage.
The simplest illustration of the link between limited arbitrage and no-arbitrage is
an economy E where the traders' initial endowments are zero, Ht = 0 for i — 1,2.
Here no-arbitrage at the initial endowments means that there are no trades which could
increase the traders' utility at zero cost: gains from trade in E must be zero. By
contrast, E has limited arbitrage when no trader can increase utility beyond a given
bound at zero cost; as seen in Proposition 2 of Section 1, gains from trade are bounded.
In summary: no-arbitrage requires that there should be no gains from trade at zero cost,
while limited arbitrage requires that there should be only bounded or limited gains from
trade.
The two concepts are related but nonetheless quite different. No-arbitrage is a
market clearing condition: it is used to describe an allocation at which there is no
further reason to trade. It can be applied at the initial allocations, but then it means
that there is no reason for trade: the economy is autarchic and therefore not very
interesting. By contrast, limited arbitrage is applied only to the economy's initial data,
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the traders' endowments and preferences, and it does not imply that the economy is
autarchic. Quite to the contrary, it is valuable in predicting whether the economy can
ever reach a competitive equilibrium, and allows us to do this simply by examining the
economy's initial conditions. This is the subject of the next section.
3. Limited Arbitrage and Market Equilibrium. Limited arbitrage identifies
fully those economies which have a competitive market equilibrium.2 I concentrate here
on competitive market allocations because they are Pareto efficient, which makes them
desirable from the point of view of resource allocation, while other lesser concepts of
equilibrium are not3. A competitive equilibrium for the economy E is a price p* and
an allocation x\...x*H € RNxH such that each trader i = 1...H maximizes utility within
a budget, U{(x*) - Max(u{(x)) for x € {y € RN :< p*,y - Ht > = 0}, and all N
markets clear, Ylf=\{xi ~ ^*) = {0}- When the market has bounds on short sales, its
trading space is the positive orthant RN+ and the market cones are slightly different;
they are denoted dD{ and defined in the Appendix. The condition of limited arbitrage
is however always the same: all market cones intersect, H^LjdD, ^ <f>. The following
holds in economies E with or without short sales:
PROPOSITION 1. The economy E has a competitive equilibrium if and only if it
satisfies limited arbitrage.
The Appendix has a proof for economies with short sales; Graciela Chichilnisky [4]
has a proof for economies without short sales. Other sufficient conditions for existence
of an equilibrium with short sales-in finite or infinite dimensions4-are in Chichilnisky
and Geoffrey M. Heal [12], but limited arbitrage is the first necessary and sufficient
condition for existence of a competitive equilibrium in economies with or without short
sales. Sufficiency requires that the Pareto frontier of the economy be bounded and
closed: both can fail in economies with short sales, and both are crucial for existence.
The Appendix establishes that limited arbitrage implies both. It is intuitively clear that
limited arbitrage is needed for an equilibrium to exist. Otherwise, as seen in Figure 2,
traders with very diverse preferences wish to take unboundedly short and long positions
against each other. Desired trades are too diverse to be accommodated within the same
economy.
At first sight it may seem surprising that limited arbitrage is also necessary for the
existence of a competitive equilibrium in economies where no short sales are allowed.
However, equilibrium fails here in a similar way: it fails when traders wish to take
unboundedly large positions which the bounded resources of the economy cannot ac-
commodate. Paradoxically, this occurs when some of the traders have zero income, i.e.
when some prices are zero, and some traders' endowments are in the boundary of RN+.
Kenneth Arrow [2] gave an example of a standard economy which has no competitive
equilibrium: one with two traders and two goods, without short sales, and where pref-
erences are continuous, concave and increasing. Trader one owns only the first good,
which trader two does not like.5 The second trader has strictly positive endowments
of both goods but does not value the first good; therefore at an equilibrium the second
trader does not trade, the first good must be free, and the first trader's income zero.
Trader one likes the first good, which is free.6 Therefore there can be no competitive
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equilibrium: no allocation can maximize the first trader's utility when the first good is
free. This example can be extended to economies with any number of traders and of
goods, and where some traders with positive income wish and can afford unbounded
positions. Arrow and Lionel McKenzie introduced resource relatedness and irreducibil-
ity to solve the non-existence problem [2]: they eliminate traders with zero income by
restricting divergences in tastes and in endowments. It should be obvious by now why
the failure of existence is the same in economies with or without short sales. The failure
originates from some traders wishing to take unbounded positions which that can afford
at the going prices. An interesting angle on this problem is that, when no short sales
are allowed, the failure of existence occurs when some traders have zero income because
what they own is of no market value, while some traders wish, and can afford, to take
unboundedly large trading positions.
It turns out that the existence of a competitive equilibrium is decided within sets
of at most N + 1 traders. In an economy E with H traders7, each subset of traders
9 C {I...H} defines a sub economy E$ of E:
PROPOSITION 2. The economy E has a competitive equilibrium if and only if every
subeconomy EQ with at most 7V + 1 traders does, where N is the dimension of the trading
space.
The proof of this proposition is in Chichilnisky [4], [10]. It is due to the fact that
all market cones in E intersect when every subfamily of at most N -\- 1 market cones
does.
The easiest way to visualize the connection between limited arbitrage and the ex-
istence of an equilibrium is in an economy with two traders who have linear utility
functions 8 and where short sales are allowed. Such an economy has a competitive equi-
librium when, and only when, the two traders' preferences are identical; otherwise it is
always possible to find a sequence of affordable trades along which the utility of both
traders increases without bound, such as that illustrated in Figure 2. This economy
has limited arbitrage precisely when the two linear preferences are identical, and only
then: the global cones A\, A-i of linear preferences are half-spaces, and the market cones
Di, D2 are half lines defined by the preferences' gradients. The market cones intersect
if and only if the two gradients are identical. Therefore this economy has a competitive
equilibrium if and only if it satisfies limited arbitrage.
Simple non-linear examples can also be given: Figure 2 illustrates an economy
without limited arbitrage. At any prices there is a sequence of affordable trades
(wn, w'n)n=iy2... in Figure 2 along which the traders can achieve unbounded utility levels,
so that no competitive equilibrium can exist.
There are standard conditions which ensure the existence of a competitive equilib-
rium, such as that no indifference surface intersects the boundary of RN+, or that all
traders have a strictly positive endowment of every single good. These are very strong
conditions, and Arrow and Hahn find them "unrealistic" [2], p. 80. In any case all
these conditions imply limited arbitrage, because being necessary for existence, limited
arbitrage must be satisfied by any economy which has a competitive equilibrium.
4. Social Diversity, Limited Arbitrage and Efficient Markets. What if the
economy does not have limited arbitrage? Then it is socially diverse:
DEFINITION 1. The economy E is socially diverse when p|£Li A = <t>>
This concept is robust under small errors in measurement and is independent of the
units of measurement or choice of numeraire. If E is not socially diverse, all economies
sufficiently close in endowments and preferences have the same property: the concept
is structurally stable. Social diversity admits different "shades"; these can be measured,
for example, by the smallest number of market cones which do not intersect:
DEFINITION 2. The economy E has index of diversity I(E) = H — K if K + \ is
the smallest number s.t. 3T C {1...H} with cardinality of T = i f + 1, and flief A = <f>.
The index I(E) ranges between 0 and H — 1 : the larger the index, the larger the
social diversity. The index is smallest when all the market cones intersect: then all
social diversity disappears, and is replaced by limited arbitrage. Proposition 1 implies:
PROPOSITION 3. The index of social diversity is I{E) if and only if every subecon-
omy of E with H — I(E) traders has a competitive equilibrium.
5. Limited Arbitrage and Social Choice. It turns out that limited arbitrage,
or the absence of social diversity, is crucial for achieving resource allocation via social
choice. Social choice rules allocate resources by assigning a social preference $(UI...UH)
to each profile {U\...UH) of individual preferences9 of an economy E, in a way which
respects ethical axioms. The social preference ranks allocations in RNxH, and is used
to locate an optimal allocation. This procedure requires, of course, that an appropriate
social choice rule $ should exist: the role of limited arbitrage is important because it
ensures existence. This was demonstrated rigorously in Chichilnisky [8], and will be
illustrated below.
There are two main approaches to social choice. One is Arrow's: his axioms of social
choice require that the rules 3> be non-dictatorial, independent of irrelevant alternatives,
and satisfy a Pareto condition. A second approach requires, instead, that the rule $ be
continuous, anonymous, and respect unanimity, Chichilnisky [6]. Though the two sets
of axioms are quite different, I show below that limited arbitrage is nevertheless closely
connected with both.
Arrow's impossibility theorem established that a social choice rule $ does not exist
in general; the problem of social choice has no solution unless individual preferences
are restricted. Duncan Black [3] established that "single peakedness" of preferences is
a sufficient restriction. Using different axioms, Chichilnisky [6], [8] established that a
social choice rule $ does not generally exist; Chichilnisky and Heal [11] established for
the first time a necessary and sufficient restriction for the resolution of the social choice
paradox: the contractibility of the space of preferences10, which can be interpreted as
a limitation on preference diversity, Heal [13]. In all cases, therefore, the problem of
social choice is resolved by restricting the diversity of individual preferences.
I shall show next that the traders' preferences in the economy E satisfy limited
arbitrage if and only if they contain no Condorcet triples of large utility values. Con-
dorcet triples are building blocks of Arrow's impossibility theorem, and are at the root
of the social choice problem. Thus limited arbitrage eliminates the source of Arrow's
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impossibility theorem for choices of large utility values.
DEFINITION 1. A Condorcet triple is a collection of three preferences over a choice
set X, represented by utilities Ui : X —* R, i = 1,2,3, and three choices a, (3, 7 within
a feasible set Y C X such that ui(a) > u\{(3) > ^1(7), 1*2(7) > u2(a:) > u2({3), and
u3(/3) > 1*3(7) > M<*)-
Within an economy E, the social choice problem is about the choice of allocations:
choices are in X = RNxH. An allocation (X\...XH) is feasible if Yli(xi ~ fii) = 0- Pref-
erences over allocations are induced naturally by the traders' preferences over private
consumption: U{(XI...XH) > Ui(yi...yn) <=> ufai) > W,(T/,).
DEFINITION 2. In an economy E a family of preferences {wi-..u//} has a Con-
dorcet triple of size k if there exists three feasible allocations ak — (a*, or*, a*) €
X C RNx3;flk = (/?f, /3^, ^3) and 7* = (7*,7*?73)? and three preferences uk,uk,uk 6
{U\..MH} which define a Condorcet triple, and such that each trader achieves at least a
utility level k at each choice: mmi=i<2,3{[uk(ak),uk(f3k),Ui(/yk)]} > k.
The following shows that limited arbitrage eliminates Condorcet triples on matters
of great importance, namely on those with utility level approaching the supremum of
utilities:
PROPOSITION 3. Let E be a market economy E with no bounds on short sales.
Then E has social diversity if and only if its traders' preferences have Condorcet triples
of every size.11 Equivalently, E has limited arbitrage if and only for some k > 0, the
traders' preferences have no Condorcet triples of size larger than k.
A proof is in the Appendix: it relies on the fact that limited arbitrage is equivalent
to bounded gains from trade, Proposition 2 of Section 1.
Turning now to the second approach to social choice, Chichilnisky [10] [8], the link
connecting markets with social choices is still very close but takes a different form: the
contractibility of the space of preferences, which is necessary and sufficient for continu-
ous, anonymous rules which respect unanimity [11], is shown to be equivalent to limited
arbitrage [10]. Therefore limited arbitrage, or equivalently the lack of social diversity, is
necessary and sufficient for resource allocation via social choice rules. Formally: let P
consist of all those preferences which are similar to those of the market economy E, in
the sense that their gradients are in the intersection of the market cones of the traders,
see [8] and [10]. Intuitively a preference is similar to that of trader i when it prefers
those allocations which assign i a consumption vector which U{ prefers.
THEOREM 4. A continuous anonymous social choice rule $ : Pk —• P which
respects unanimity exists which for every k > 2 if and only if the economy E has
limited arbitrage.
For a proof see [8].
6. Appendix. Definitions: An economy E is defined by its trading space and its
traders E = {X,ty € RN+,Ui : X -> R, i = 1...H}, where X = RN,ov X = RN+
when no short sales are allowed. The traders' preferences U{ : X —• R are contin-
uous, concave and increasing: x > y =£• Ui(x) > Ui(y) and u,(0) = 0. When the
trading space X = RN+, if an indifference surface of positive utility intersects the
boundary of RN+ all indifference surfaces of higher utility do too. When the trading
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space X = RN preferences are smooth (C2), 3e,K > 0 : Wx G RN, \\Du(x)\\ > e,
and ||Z)2w(x)|| < if, and the directions of gradients of an indifference surface which
is not bounded below form a closed set. This includes Cobb-Douglas, CES, strictly
concave and linear preferences, and preferences with indifferences which intersect the
axis, and which contain halflines. Global cones A{ and market cones D{ were defined
in Section 1. The market cone dZ), of an economy E with trading space RN+ is
dDi = Di 0 S(E) if S(E) C N, and dD{ = D{ otherwise, where N = {v G RN : 3t
with < VjVti > = 0}, and where S(E) is the set of supports to individually rational
allocations: S(E) = {v G RN : 3(x1...xH) G # " x ^ + with £ ( z t - f t t ) = 0, ti^x,-) > ti,-(ft<)
for all i, and Vz,- G
 JRiV+, u,-(^i) > ufai) =>< v,Zi — £,- >> 0}. The utility set is
U(E) = {C/ i , . . .^ G # H + + : V» = l...#,3zi...Ztf with U{ = u t(z t) > tx^fi,-) where
£*Li(*.' - ^ i ) < 0}. The Pareto frontierP(E) = {V = Vl..VH G tf(£) :~ 3Wi...W^ G
t/(^) with Wj>Uj\/ j and for some h, Wh > Uh}.
PROPOSITION 1. The global cones A{ of the economy E are open convex sets.
Proof. A sequence (fn)n=i,2... C C(A{) = the complement of A,-, defines halflines
(rn)n=it2..., with 5up{x:xer"}(ut(:c)) < °° Vn- By the assumptions on w,- , V n 3y G Fn :<
Du{(y),w > = 0 if w G Tn. Concavity of w,- implies that Vw; G Fn < Du,(Ay),u; > < 0
V A > 1. Assume that on two halflines Fn ^ Fm the utility Ui is eventually constant:
3yn G Fn and ym G Fm such that VA > 1 < Dui(\yn),w >= 0 Vw G Fn , and <
Du,-(A2/m),itf > = 0 Viy G F m , and w,(yn) < w,(ym). Let II be a supporting hyperplane
for the preferred set of w, at Xym; this determines a halfspace A of RN : V<? G A, ut(^) <
w,(Ai/m); note that II contains an unbounded segment of Fm , and A an unbounded
segment of Fn . Therefore V K > 0 3 zK G Fn and wK G II : \\zK - wK\\ > K
and WK, U{(zK) = Ui(yn) and Ui(wK) = ut(?/m). Since by assumption 3e > 0 : Va?,
||Dw,-(a;)|| > £, ViC the distance between zK and {w G J?^ : w,(t^) = w,(ym)} is bounded:
3T > 0 :VK, \\zK — wK\\ < T, a contradiction. The contradiction arises from assuming
that U{ is eventually constant on Fn and Fm with n ^ m; therefore 3n0 : Vj > no
3y G F-7 :< Du{(\y),w > < 0 Viu G F-7 and VA > 1. By concavity of i^, this implies
that along the halfline F defined by v = limn vn, w,- is bounded, so that v G C(Ai). Thus
C(A{) is closed and A,- open. Convexity is immediate.Q
THEOREM 2. Let E be an economy without bounds on short sales. The Pareto
frontier of the economy E is bounded if and only if the economy satisfies limited arbi-
trage. In particular, the economy E has bounded gains from trade, G(E) < oo, if and
only if it has limited arbitrage.
Proof. By contradiction. Assume E has limited arbitrage. If P(E) were not
bounded there would exist a sequence of net trades {z{...zJH)j=if2... such that Vj, Y^i?=i zi =
0 and lirrij^oofw^(fi/i + */[)) —• °° f° r some h.12 It suffices to consider the case where
lirrij-.^(uhiflh + zi)) —* °° f°r a ^ ^-13 Consider two exhaustive and exclusive cases:
Case 1 and Case 2. Case 1: For infinitely many j 's, z3h G Ah for all h. Limited arbi-
trage requires that there exists a hyperplane that leaves all the cones Ah on one side
for all h, and this contradicts the fact that zJh G Ah for all h and ]C£Li z{ = ®- Since
the contradiction arises from the assumption that P(E) is unbounded, P{E) must be
bounded in this case. Case 2: From some j onwards, zJh (fc Ah for some h. Consider
the sequence {Zh/\\z3h\\}j=it2,... C SN~X, the N — 1 sphere in RN. Since 5 N * is com-
pact, it follows that there exists a subsequence, denoted also {^/||^||}j=i,2,... such that
limj_Kx,2Ji/||zj[|| = cxh G SN~* for all h = \...H. Assume first that ah £ Ah. Note that
it suffices to consider utilities with indifference surfaces not bounded below, since when
they are bounded below, P(E) is always a bounded set. Then, by assumption, the
directions of gradients of each indifference surface define a closed set. Since we assumed
that ah £ Ah, it follows that Sup\eR+(uh(Qh + Aa*) < oo. This, together with the
assumption on the utilities, implies that if F is the halfline defined by the vector ah ,
either 3w G F where the gradient Duh{z) is orthogonal to F, or else the utility Uh
achieves a maximum at y G F, and is a constant beyond y. These two alternatives are
exhaustive and I will show that in both it is impossible that ah = l imjz j / | | ^ | | with
limj_oo(ii^(n/l + z3h) = oo. If the gradient Duh (w) is orthogonal to F at some point
w, and for A > 1 Duh(^w) projected on F is negative, then it is also negative in a
neighborhood. Therefore for directions (3 sufficiently close to ah , 3K > 0 such that
supxeT(u^,(a;)) < K, a contradiction. The second alternative is that Ui utility achieves
a maximum at w and remains constant thereafter on F. Similar reasoning, using con-
vexity, shows that limj_oo(y.h{$lh + z3h)) = oo cannot hold either. Since these two
alternatives are exhaustive, a^ ^ Ah is impossible, so that ah G Ah for all h where
z3h £ Ah from some j onwards. Therefore, in Case 2, V/t = 1...H the vectors ah G A£,
the closure of Ah, and, for some h, ah € Ah. Since the cones Ah are open by Proposition
1 in the Appendix, there exist nearby vectors (3I...(3H s.t. YlhPh = 0 and fa G Ah
for all h, contradicting limited arbitrage. Limited arbitrage thus implies that P(E) is
bounded. The reciprocal is immediate.!!!
THEOREM 3. Let E be an economy without bounds on short sales. Then E has a
competitive equilibrium if and only it has limited arbitrage.
Proof. Necessity first. Assume that E has a competitive equilibrium consisting
of a price p*, and an allocation x\...x*H. If limited arbitrage is not satisfied, then
3i and Z{ € At- such that < p*,Zi > < 0. Therefore VA > 0, fi,- -f Xz{ is in trader
i's budget set and for some A > 0, ut-(Az,-) > U{{x*), a contradiction: the equilib-
rium cannot exist. Sufficiency next. I shall use Negishi's theorem to prove existence
of a quasiequilibrium, namely a price and an allocation at which markets clear and
traders minimize cost subject to their utility levels [14]; this suffices since a quasiequi-
librium is a competitive equilibrium when allocations with strictly lower utility are
feasible ([2]) as they are here. Negishi's proof applies Kakutani's fixed point theorem
on the Pareto frontier and requires that the utility set U(E) be convex, bounded and
closed. This is immediate when the indifference surfaces are bounded below, Arrow
and Hahn [2]. Therefore I consider only utilities which do not satisfy this condition.
Convexity is immediate: see e.g. [2], and boundedness follows from Theorem 2 in
the Appendix: therefore I need only establish that P(E) is closed when limited ar-
bitrage is satisfied. Let T = {(wi...wH) € RNxH : T,ili(wi - ^«) = 0}- For any
r G RH+ let v - (vi...vH) £ RH+ = Sup(U(E) n r), which exists because U(E) is
bounded by Theorem 2 above. Consider a sequence of Pareto efficient utility levels
Un = (wi(^), ...uH(zJj)) in P(E) converging to u, (z?...z%) € T. I shall prove that
v G P{E). Since U(E) is bounded and utilities are increasing, there exists an allo-
cation (t/i...?///) G RNxH, which may or not be feasible : v = (ui(yi)...u//(?/tf)) =
limn(ui(z"), ...UH{ZH))- By standard arguments, the directions of all the gradients
must draw close to each other, i.e. V/i = 1...H, limn,m^oo[(Z)u/l(z£)/||JDu/l(z£)||) —
(Duh(zZ)/\\Duh(z%)\\)] = 0. Let snh = Duh{z^)/\\Duh{z^)\\ G SN'\ the unit sphere
in RN; by compactness there exist a point of accumulation s G RN for (<s>|)n=i,2...
which is common to all h. Since V/i, Uh{z%) —» u^ then Ve > 0 3T and w% G RN
such that uh(w%) = vh and \\{Duh(z^)/\\Duh(z^\\ - Duh(y?)/\\Duh{y?)\\)\\ < e for
n > T; without loss choose the sequence {2n}n=i,2... = {2r?---2r&}i)2,... so that Vn and
V/i, 2£ = w^"1(u/l). By compactness of SN~* there exists a subsequence, denoted also
{Du^z^/^Duiiz^l..., DuH(z%)/\\DuH(z?j)\\}n=ia... converging to the common di-
rection (s...s) G RNxH. By the assumptions on preferences, there exists z — (Z\...ZH) G
ftNxH
 s u c j 1 that Zh G u^l{vh) and Duh{zh) — A s^ for some A^  > 0. It is now standard
to show that Ylh{zh — ^h) = 0; if the sequence of allocations (zjl...^)n=i,2... is bounded
or has a bounded subsequence this is immediate. If not, define the set Q of allocations
(which may or not be feasible) attaining the utility level V\...VH and having gradients
colinear with s : Q = {(<7i...<7#) € RNxH : Duh(qh) = As for some A, and Vh = Uh{qh)}-
Q is not empty, since z = {Z\...ZH) € Q', Q is a closed, convex, affine subset of i?^. But
the sequence of allocations (^.••zjy) approaches the set Q as closely as desired, and it
is feasible. Therefore Q and T are at zero distance, so they intersect, i.e. there exists
a feasible allocation (yi...yfj) € RNxH such that Duh{yh) = A/jS and Vh = w/l(y^), so
P(E) is closed.D
PROPOSITION 4. Le£ £ be an economy without bounds on short sales and H > 3
traders. E has Condorcet triple of all sizes if and only if it is socially diverse, i.e. if
and only if it does not satisfy limited arbitrage.
Proof. Let E have limited arbitrage. For each k > 0, let (ak,/3k,jk) G R3xNxH
and Uj, 1X2,^ 3 C {UI...UH} be a Condorcet triple of size k. Without loss assume that
Vi, 0,- = 0, and choose a utility representation : Vz, Sup{x:xeRNy(iii(x)) = oo. The
three allocations are feasible Vfc, e.g. ak — (ak,ak,ak) 6 RNx3, Yll=i{ai) = 0, and
limk_cc(niin,-=i,2,3('Ut-(ai), Ui(/3k), ui{li)) = °°- There exist therefore three traders called
1,2, and 3 and a corresponding sequence of allocations (#fc)jt=i,2... = (0k,#25^3)^=1,2...:
^&? 52* ^ ? = 0 an<i Vi = 1,2,3, sup^.^^ M,-(^) = 00. This implies that E has unbounded
gains from trade, which contradicts Theorem 6. Therefore E cannot have Condorcet
triples of every size.
Conversely, if E has no limited arbitrage, there exist three traders, called 1,2, 3,
with preferences iti, 112,1*3 and three vectors in RN, a 6 Ai,b G A2, c G A3, which
add up to zero. For any integer k > 0, and small s > 0 consider the vector A =
(e,...,e) G RN+ and the following three allocations: ak = (ka, kb — 2A, kc + 2A),
(3k = (ka — A, &&, kc -\- A) and 7* = (ka — 2A, &6 — A, kc + 3A); each allocation is
feasible, e.g. fca + fc& - 2A + kc + 2A = fc(a + 6 4- c) = 0. For each k > 0 the three
allocations ak,/3k,'*fk and the three utilities Ui,U2,u3 define a Condorcet triple of size
m(k), with limfc->oo m(k) = oo.D
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Figurel: limited arbitrage is satisfied. The two global cones lie
in the halfspace defined by P. There are no feasible trades that
increase utilities without limit: these would consist of pairs of
points symmetrically placed about the common initial endowment,
and as shown such pairs of points lead to utility values below
those of the endowments at a bounded distance from the initial
endowments.
Figure 2: Limited arbitrage does not hold. The global cones are not
contained in a half space, and there are sequences of feasible allocations
such as Wi and Wi1, W2 and W21, which produce unbounded utilities.
Notes.
1
 Global cones and market cones were introduced in Chichilnisky [4], as was the
concept of limited arbitage
2Utilities are continuous, concave, non-decreasing and satisfy mild regularily condi-
tions; they include Cobb-Douglas and CES utilities, utilities with indifferences which
intersect the orthants, linear and partially linear utilities, see the Appendix.
3For example, neither a quasiequilibrium nor a compensated equilibrium is generally
Pareto efficient, see Arrow and Hahn [2].
4Chichilnisky and Heal [12] prove existence in Sobolev spaces, which are Hilbert
spaces made of either measurable, continuous or smooth functions.
5I.e. Va > 0 and Vz, y G R2, u2(x + a, y) = u2{x, y).
6I.e. Vx, y G R2 and Va > 0, Ui(x + a, y) > u\(x, y).
7Each trader has a preference w,- : RN —• R satisfying the stated conditions, and an
endowment Hj € RN >
8Utilities are linear when Va, /? G R-, u,(ax -f {3y) = aui(x) + j3iii(y).
9In the economy E the traders' preferences are defined over private consumption
U{ : RN —> R, but they define automatically preferences over allocations in RNxH :
10A space X is contractible when there exists a continuous map f : X x [0,1] —* X
and xo G X such that Vz, / ( z , 0) = x and f(x, 1) = x0.
uWithout loss of generality assume that for all i, Sup{x;xenNyUi(x) = oo
12Without loss of generality, we normalized utilities so that snpxeRN(ufl(x)) — oo.
13By the assumptions on preferences if 3(ui...u3H)j=it2... : Vj, Y,h=i uh ~
^oo(uh(Qh + u3h)) -* oo for some h, uh{£lh + u>Jh) > uh(Qh) Vft, then 3(z{
ALI zi = 0 and limJ_^oo(u/l(n/l + z{)) —^  oo for all /i.
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